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Abstract
We identify a mistake in the specication of the demand system
used in the strategic delegation model based on market shares by
Jansen et al. (2007), whereby the price remains above marginal cost
when goods are homogeneous. After amending this aspect, we per-
form a prot comparison with the alternative delegation scheme à la
Fershtman and Judd (1987).
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Jansen, van Lier and vanWitteloostuijn (2007, JLW hence-
forth) investigate the properties of Cournot and Bertrand behaviour in a
strategic delegation model where contracts instruct managers to maximise
a combination of prots and market shares.1 In this note, we single out a
mistake in the specication of the market demand functions, that in JLW are
modelled in such a way that the resulting prices do not collapse to marginal
cost under full product substitutability. To amend this aspect, we properly
dene demands and work out the Bertrand case anew, and then proceed to
compare the performance of rms against the alternative delegation scheme
adopted by Fershtman and Judd (1987).
2 The model
Consider a di¤erentiated duopoly where symmetric rms share the same
marginal and average production cost c 2 [0; 1) : JLW set out to sketch the
price competition case by adopting the demand system
qi = 1  pi + (1  ) pj (1)
where qi and pi are rm is quantity and price, respectively, and  2 [0; 1]
measures the degree of di¤erentiation, with homogeneous goods at  = 0
and  < 1=c (see JLW, 2007, p. 536). Before delving into the details of the
1There has been an increasing interest in strategic incentive models where managers are
compensated based on prots and market shares, see e.g. Ritz (2008) and Wang and Wang
(2010). In recent contributions, the performance of rms using such type of contracts for
their managers has been compared to results obtained in the cases of sales, revenue, and
relative prots, see Jansen et al. (2009), Manasakis et al. (2010) and, more general, Berr
(2011). All these contributions with the exception of Jansen et al. (2007), who briey
consider the price-setting model focus on quantity competition.
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strategic delegation case, it is worth focussing the attention on the features
of price competition based on (1) assuming rms are strict prot-seeking
(entrepreneurial) units. The objective of owner i is
max
pi
i = (pi   c) [1  pi + (1  ) pj] ; (2)
requiring
@i
@pi
= 1 + c  2pi + (1  ) pj = 0 (3)
whereby the candidate symmetric equilibrium price is p = (1 + c) = (1 + ) ;
and the resulting per-rm output and prots are q = (1  c) = (1 + ) and
 = (1  c)2 = (1 + )2 = (q)2 :
Now, if  were indeed a direct measure of product di¤erentiation, one
should observe both price and prots monotonically increasing in ; while
instead the opposite applies:
@p
@
=   1 + c
(1 + )
< 0 always;
@
@
=
2 (1 + c) (c  1)
(1 + )3
< 08  < 1
c
(4)
and imposing @=@ > 0 would in turn imply q < 0:
Moreover, under full substitutability, marginal cost pricing with zero prof-
its should of course emerge, while setting  = 0 yields p = 1 + c > c and
 = 1: Also, note that 1 + c > (1 + c) =2; which implies that this model
yields a duopoly price with homogeneous goods higher than full monopoly
price.2
The source of this issue is to be found in a mistaken normalization. This
becomes apparent as soon as one, instead of (1), adopts the demand system
2The same problem, generated by an analogous demand structure, appears in Sklivas
(1987, eq. (7), p. 455) and Miller and Pazgal (2001, p. 285), and also in Fershtman and
Judd (1987, section 5).
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dating back to Bowley (1924) and then revived by Spence (1976), Dixit (1979)
and Singh and Vives (1984), inter alia:
qi =
a
1 + s
  bpi
1  s2 +
spj
1  s2 (5)
where a > c, b > 0 and s 2 ( b; b); with parameter s measuring the degree of
substitutability (in the positive range) or complementarity (in the negative
range) between goods. One can indeed dene
s
1  s2  1   (6)
but then the simultaneous normalization of a= (1 + s) and b= (1  s2) to one
is altogether inadmissible, as a= (1 + s) 6= b= (1  s2), and incompatible with
(6).
Accordingly, in the remainder we will use (5), posing a = b = 1 for the
sake of simplicity. Now we proceed to the analysis of the two-stage duopoly
game between managerial rms in the market share case.
The manager of rm i is assigned the following objective function:
Mi = i +
wiqi
qi + qj
(7)
where wi is the delegation variable to be chosen by the owner at the rst
stage. The rst order conditions (FOC) at the market stage for i = 1; 2 are
@Mi
@pi
=
1 + c  s  2pi + spj
1  s2  
wi (1 + s) (1  pj)
(1  s) (2  pi   pj)2
= Fi(pi; pj; wi; wj) = 0
(8)
and solving this system would yield the Bertrand-Nash equilibrium prices
in the form pBNi (wi; wj) : In order to obtain the expressions of prices, we
proceed as JLW (2007, p. 534) do in the quantity space. First, consider the
owners FOC at the contract stage:
@i
@wi
=
@pi
@wi

1
1 + s
  2pi   c
1  s2 +
spj
1  s2

+
s (pi   c)
1  s2
@pj
@wi
= 0: (9)
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To obtain the partial derivatives @pi
@wi
and @pj
@wi
, we di¤erentiate the FOC (8)
with respect to wi and wj taking into account that pi = pi(wi; wj). The
resulting linear system can be simply written as2664
@Fi
@pi
@Fi
@pj
@Fj
@pi
@Fj
@pj
3775
| {z }
=:F
 
@pi
@wi
@pj
@wi
!
=  
 
@Fi
@wi
@Fj
@wi
!
:
Applying Cramers rule, the solutions can now be obtained as
@pi
@wi
=   1
JF

2664
@Fi
@wi
@Fi
@pj
@Fj
@wi
@Fj
@pj
3775 ; @pj@wi =   1JF
264
@Fi
@pi
@Fi
@wi
@Fj
@pi
@Fj
@wi
375 ; (10)
where JF = F and  denotes the determinant of the corresponding matrix.
Inserting these expressions into (9) yields an additional condition which
has to hold in equilibrium. If we now exploit the ex ante symmetry of the
model and set pi = pj = p and wi = wj = w, from (8) we obtain
w =
4 (1  p) [1 + c  s  p (2  s)]
(1 + s)2
: (11)
Inserting this expression into the condition (9) and assuming symmetry, we
obtain a quadratic polynomial with solutions
p =
10  s (10  s) + c [6  s (2 + s)] (1  c)p4  [8  s (4 + s)] s2
4 (4  3s) :
(12)
We have
lims!1 p+ =
1 + c
2
; lims!1 p  = c
lims!0 p+ =
3 + c
4
; lims!0 p  =
1 + c
2
(13)
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so that we take p  as the only reasonable candidate equilibrium price. This
is conrmed by looking at the corresponding individual output levels:
q =
(1  c)
h
6  s (2 + s)p4  [8  s (4 + s)] s2i
4 (1 + s) (4  3s) (14)
with
lims!0 q+ = lims!1 q+ =
1  c
4
lims!0 q  = lims!1 q  =
1  c
2
(15)
A denitive element in favour of p  is the stability analysis based on the
determinant of the Jacobian matrix in the price space, revealing that
@2Mi
@p2i
  @
2Mi
@pi@pj
< 0 in p = p+
@2Mi
@p2i
  @
2Mi
@pi@pj
> 0 in p = p 
whereby the solution p  is stable while the other is not.
Now that we have obtained the correct solutions to the price-setting del-
egation game for the market share case, we may move on to compare the
equilibrium price p  obtained above with that characterising the incentive
scheme used by Fershtman and Judd (1987, FJ henceforth). In the FJ case
the objective of manager i is3
Mi = ii + (1  i)Ri; (16)
Ri = piqi being the rms revenues. We stick to our previous normalisation,
a = b = 1. From the FOCs in the price space one obtains
pFJ =
2 (1 + ic)  s (1 + s  jc)
4  s2 (17)
3Thi is equivalent to the approach used by Vickers (1985). See the appendix in Lam-
bertini and Trombetta (2002).
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Then, prot maximization at the rst stage requires
FJ =
(1  s) s2 + c (2  s2) (2  s)
c [2 (2  s)  s2] (18)
so that (17) simplies as follows:
pFJ =
2 (1  s) + c (2  s2)
4  s (2 + s) (19)
which of course belongs to the interval [c; (1 + c) =2] for all s 2 [0; 1] : At this
point a numerical excercise su¢ ces to check that pFJ < p  and consequently
also that prots are lower under the FJ delegation scheme than under market
share-based contracts for all s 2 (0; 1). To sum up, this conrms the qual-
itative conclusion attained by JLW in comparatively assessing the market
share-based incentive scheme against that of FJ.
3 Conclusion
In this note, we have shown that Jansen et al. (2007) use a misspecied
demand system, and we have corrected their mistake. We have then derived
the correct solution and compared it with the delegation game based on sales
revenue which has been originally studied in Fershtman and Judd (1987).
This has allowed us to point out that using contracts based on market share
indeed makes competition softer and results in higher prots.
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